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COMMENT
PRIVACY: DOES

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ALLOW FOR PROTECTION OF

A RAPE VICTIM'S IDENTITY?

A Comment on Cox Broadcasting Corp.

v. Cohn, 95 S.Ct. 1029 (1975)
Rape is a crime in which a greater social stigma is often attached to the victim than to the perpetrator. A robbery victim is
rarely made to feel that he "asked for it," but a rape victim frequently is. In implicit recognition of the "chilling effect" this situation has on reports and prosecutions of rape offenses, the legislatures
of Georgia' and of several other states ' have enacted statutes prohibiting media disclosure of a rape victim's name or identity. That the
identity of a rape victim is in our society a conventionally designated area of privacy is witnessed by the fact that many newspapers, if not most, voluntarily refrain from divulging this information.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn3 the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute which made it a misdemeanor to disclose a rape
victim's name was successfully challenged by Cox Broadcasting
Corporation. In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that for a state to impose criminal or civil sanctions
upon the media for the dissemination of truthful information obtained from public records violated the first amendment guarantees
of freedom of speech and of press. The Court declined to decide the
broader question "whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the first and
fourteenth amendments, or. . .whether the States may ever define
and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity."4
Thus, the decision apparently leaves intact the common law tort of
invasion of privacy, but fails to articulate when, if ever, criminal or
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972):
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish,
broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination
or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any
newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication published in this State or
through any radio or television broadcast originating in the State the name or identity
of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to
commit rape may have been made. Any person or corporation violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 194.03 (Supp. 1975-76); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (Supp. 1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 942.02 (Supp. 1975-76).
3. 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
4. Id. at 1044.
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civil liability may attach for the publication of accurate information
which intrudes upon an individual's privacy.
This Comment proposes to consider whether it may ever be
constitutionally permissible for a state to prohibit the revelation of
damaging personal information obtained from public records and
whether the holding in Cox necessarily blocks all avenues of judicial
relief to a rape victim who has suffered measurable harm as a result
of media publicity.
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Appellee's 17-year-old daughter died after being raped by six
fellow high school students. Eight months later, appellant broadcasting corporation identified Cohn's deceased daughter by name
during a televised newscast describing a courtroom appearance of
the six defendants. Cohn brought an action for invasion of privacy
against the reporter who had made the disclosure and against the
company which owned the station over which it had been aired. He
based his action on a Georgia statute which made it a misdemeanor
to print or broadcast or otherwise disseminate to the public a female
rape victim's name.' It was not disputed that the reporter learned
the victim's identity by examining the indictments, which were
public records open for general inspection. The trial court disagreed
with appellants' contention that their broadcasts of true and accurate information, gleaned from public records, fell under the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments and granted summary
judgment to appellee on the ground that the statute gave him a civil
remedy. Since no factual dispute existed, liability followed as a
matter of law with the amount of damages to be determined at trial
by a jury.
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court
had erred in construing the statute to extend a civil remedy.' Nevertheless, appellee's complaint did set out the elements of a cause of
action for the common law tort of invasion of privacy. Accordingly,
the trial judge's grant of summary judgment had been improper, for
unresolved issues of fact were still to be determined at trial: principally, whether or not appellee's privacy had in fact been wilfully or
negligently violated and, if so, to what extent. The court rejected
appellants' argument that such a limitation on the media's right to
disseminate information was necessarily barred by the first and
fourteenth amendment guarantees of free speech and free press. It
5.
6.

See note 1 supra.
Cox v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/5

COMMENT

19761

stressed that a weighing of societal values dictated that appellee's
right of privacy be protected at the expense of appellants' right to
disclose the information.
Upon motion for rehearing, the Georgia Supreme Court dealt
specifically with the constitutionality of §26-9901 and deemed it a
valid restriction on first amendment rights, since the identity of a
rape victim was not within the province of legitimate public concern
and therefore did not "rise to the level of First Amendment protection." 7
II.

OPINION OF THE COURT

The issue before the Supreme Court of the United States was
whether a state could, without violating first and fourteenth amendment rights, afford appellee a cause of action for invasion of privacy
on the basis of the accurate publication of a rape victim's name,
information which was on public record and open to public inspection.'
Speaking for the Court, Justice White acknowledged the "impressive credentials" 9 of the right of privacy, but nonetheless held
that the states have no power to suppress information obtained from
a public record under the guise of protecting an individual's right
to privacy. The first and fourteenth amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of press bar imposition of civil liability for pure
expression of information obtained under these circumstances.,0 By
reporting fairly and accurately on the commission of criminal acts,
their prosecutions, and related judicial proceedings, the press is
performing the indispensable function of informing the citizenry
about an area of legitimate public concern. Acceptance of the rule
urged by appellee would invite self-censorship by the press, so that
information which might otherwise be published would instead be
suppressed. The societal interest in a vigorous free press overrides
7. Id. at 68, 200 S.E.2d at 134.
8. The Court first decided that jurisdiction over the appeal was proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2) (1970) by virtue of the fact that the Georgia Supreme Court drew the constitutionality of GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972) into question in a manner bearing directly on the
merits of the case and that the Georgia Court's decision was a "final judgment" within the
meaning of § 1257. All of the justices agreed that the Court's jurisdiction had been properly
invoked, with the exception of Justice Rehnquist, who based his rather lengthy dissent on
his belief that the judgment was not "final" in the sense intended by § 1257 and should
therefore have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 1043.
10. "Pure expression" is here contrasted with other forms of "speech." See, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969) (flag mutilation); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag desecration).
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a state's interest in protecting privacy where the means of protection entails suppression of information on public record.
Although he concurred in the result, Justice Douglas emphasized that he would have rested the decision upon a much broader
proposition, namely, that the first and fourteenth amendments
flatly prohibit imposition of civil liability for discussion of public
affairs, a term which is to be broadly construed to encompass any
item which generates sufficient public interest to be covered by the
media.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell voiced his disagreement with the majority's interpretation of prior decisions. Justice
White had claimed that "[tihe Court has . . .left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that
truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by
a private person." However, Justice Powell argued that "the constitutional necessity of recognizing"'" truth as a defense was implicit
in a standard of recovery based on knowledge or reckless disregard
of the truth. 3 In Gertz v. Welch" that standard had been relaxed
to allow a defamed private individual to recover compensatory damages if he could prove at least negligence on the part of the defamer.
Thus, Justice Powell noted:
[1If the statements are true, the standard contemplated by Gertz
cannot be satisfied . . .[and] I view that opinion as requiring that
the truth be recognized as a complete defense. 5

III.

BACKGROUND

Although it is of relatively recent origin," the tort of invasion
of privacy has been recognized by the large majority of states 7 and
remains expressly rejected by only three. 18In spite of the widespread
11. 95 S. Ct. at 1044.
12. Id. at 1048.
13. This was the standard established in a series of cases beginning with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the basis of recovery in defamation and "false
light" privacy cases. For discussion see infra at 22.
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15. 95 S. Ct. at 1048-49.
16. Its birth can be traced back to 1890, when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
published their essay, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis
argued that individuals who are injured by the press' publication of private information
should be granted a legal remedy.
17. W. PROSSER, TORTS, § 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971). Texas became the most recent state
to recognize the right of privacy in Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
18. Nebraska, Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955);
Rhode Island, Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); and Wisconsin, Judevine
v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/5

COMMENT

19761

acceptance this tort has achieved, there is no general consensus
about its precise definition. The most famous definition is probably
' 9
that of Professor Cooley, who called it "the right to be let alone. "'
Other commentators have defined it variously as "control over
knowledge about oneself,"20 as a right protecting an individual's
"inviolate personality,"'2' and as "the right of an individual . . . 'to
22
live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwarranted publicity.
According to Dean Prosser's analysis, there are really four torts,
not just one, within the law of privacy: 23
2
1. Intrusion upon an individual's physical solitude.
2. Public disclosure of private information about an individ25

ual .

3. Exposure of plaintiff to publicity which places him in a false

29
light in the public eye.

4. Appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness for the defendant's advantage.2
T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 (2d ed. 1888).
20. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968). Here the emphasis is not on the absence
of information about ourselves in the minds of others, but rather on our capacity to control
the dissemination of that information. A similar approach is employed in Note, Privacy in
the FirstAmendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973). Warren and Brandeis never defined the term
precisely but were concerned primarily with that aspect of privacy which spares one from idle
gossip and scandal.
21. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964).
22. 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 1 (1952).
23. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 804-15.
24. This has been construed to cover various behavior. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (electronic eavesdropping); Nader v. General Motors
Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E. 2d 765, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1970) (unauthorized wiretapping);
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (unreasonable obtrusive surveillance); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959)(an illegal search of a customer's
shopping bag in a store).
25. To be actionable, the disclosure must be of a highly objectionable nature and the
facts revealed must be truly private. Disclosures which have given rise to liability are seen
in: Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1st Dep't 1920) (the filming of a
caesarean delivery); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931)(a motion picture
revival of the past history of a reformed prostitute and former murder defendant); Brent v.
Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, Annot., 55 A.L.R. 964 (1927)(the public posting of an
individual's indebtedness).
26. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1st Dep't
1913)(attributing spurious books or articles to the plaintiff); Stern, Walter, & Simmons, Inc.
v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 308 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1970)(using plaintiff's photograph in a
suggestive advertisement).
27. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938)(unauthorized use
of an individual's name or likeness for advertising or for some other commercial purpose);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936) (impersonating another in order to obtain confidential price quotations); Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich.
443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926) (posing as someone else's spouse). "It is the plaintiff's name as a
symbol of his identity that is involved here." PROSSER, supra note 17 at 805.
19.
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Although the Restatement of Torts 8 is in accord with Prosser's categorization, his analysis has not gone unchallenged."
It was not until 1967 that the first privacy case finally reached
the Supreme Court. By its holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill,3 a "false
light" invasion of privacy case, that any publication of legitimate
public interest is privileged unless it can be shown that the defendant published with knowledge of falsity or offensiveness or in reckless disregard thereof, the Supreme Court raised the common law
newsworthiness privilege, previously recognized as absolute in some
states but only qualified in others, to a rule of constitutional law."
The decision was in many ways a natural sequel to New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan," which had revolutionized libel law by holding that
the first and fourteenth amendment protections of freedom of
speech and of press require that there be clear and convincing proof
that a defamatory falsehood regarding the official conduct of a public official was uttered with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth before recovery could be had.33
By its holding in Hill, the Supreme Court extended to privacy
law the constitutional standards which had been developed in
defamation cases, even though the interests sought to be protected
by the two torts are quite different.3 4 Apparently, the common element of falsity in defamation and false light privacy cases blinded
the Court to the true nature of the interest sought to be protected
in false light privacy cases and resulted in an unsatisfactory merging
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 A (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
29. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 21; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966).
30. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
31. For a further discussion of the newsworthy privilege see PROSSER, supra note 17 at
823-33.
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. Subsequent cases followed and extended the New York Times doctrine, applying it
to criminal libel prosecutions. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)(to all levels
of government officials); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967)(county
clerks); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1974) (police officials); St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff, political candidates); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265 (197 1)(candidate for a primary election for the U.S. Senate and to those defined as
public figures); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)(retired Army general and
political commentator); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (former athletic
director at a state university); Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)(real
estate developer).
34. "The gravamen of a defamation action is engendering a false opinion about
a person, whether in the mind of one other person or many people. The gravamen in
the public disclosure cases is degrading a person by laying his life open to public view."
Bloustein, supra note 21 at 981.
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of defamation and privacy concepts.3 5 The Court apparently failed
to appreciate that one's privacy can be invaded as effectively by the
publication of false facts as by the publication of true ones. The
interest sought to be protected is the same in both false light and
public disclosure cases. To base recovery on the publisher's recklessness or willfulness in publishing false or offensive material is to
stress the reputational interest and ignore the privacy concern. The
plaintiff in Hill was not concerned about the falsity of the information which Life magazine had published but about the fact that it
had been published at all. He was not contending that his reputation had been damaged, but rather that his and his family's privacy
had been destroyed. Accordingly, it would seem more consistent
with the nature of the tort for the Court to base recovery upon the
publisher's fault in invading the plaintiff's privacy, rather than
upon his fault in publishing inaccurate or misleading information.
In 1974, the Court had another opportunity to construe a "false
light" invasion of privacy action, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing
Co.3" However, since the defendant was found to have engaged in
knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth, the Court had
no occasion to reconsider the "actual malice" standard announced
in Hill. A few months earlier, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," the
Court had relaxed that standard in defamation cases involving
those it judged to be private individuals by holding that such plaintiffs could recover compensatory damages for actual injury if at least
negligent defamatory falsehood were proved. In order to recover
presumed or punitive damages, the New York Times standard
would have to3 be met, that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disrethereof.
gard Although
Cox, like Gertz, involved a private plaintiff, the invasion complained of in Cox was public disclosure of true facts,
whereas in Gertz it was defamation. Nevertheless, Gertz is important to privacy law since it marks the Supreme Court's first retreat
from the New York Times line of cases with their unmistakable
The Right to Speak from Time to Time: First Amendment Theory ApMisapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
245 (1974).
14 supra.
38. The Gertz holding rejected the rule established in an earlier case, Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971), according to which the fact that a matter was of
"public or general interest" was sufficient to invoke the New York Times standard regardless
of whether the plaintiff was a private or public figure. Although Rosenbloom was discussed
at length in Gertz, it was not necessary to overrule it explicitly since it had been a plurality
decision in which two justices joined Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion, two concurred
separately and three dissented.
35.
plied to
36.
37.

Nimmer,
Libel and
419 U.S.
See note
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preference for press freedoms vis-A-vis individual personality rights.
However, Cox leaves unresolved the issue of whether the more lenient Gertz standard established for defamation cases brought by
nonpublic persons will be applied to privacy law as well. 9 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that the Court had not had
the opportunity to reconsider the Hill rule and expressed doubts
about the continued viability of the Hill "public interest" test:
The Court's abandonment of the 'matter of general or public interest'
standard as the determinative factor for deciding whether to apply
the New York Times malice standard to defamation litigation
brought by private individuals. . . calls into question the conceptual
basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill.10
Thus, there is reason to think that Cox is not the setback for privacy
litigation that it may appear to be.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The right of privacy, although not expressed in the Constitution
has been found to be a peripheral right within the "penumbra" of
rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' However, only
personal rights which are deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"4 are protected by this guarantee of personal privacy.4" It is important to realize that the privacy interests
thus protected all involve governmental interference with an individual's right to determine his personal conduct or governmental
intrusion into places where one's personal life is conducted.
[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion'. . . . Other provisions of the
Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to
privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States.4
39.

See Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press:A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.

LAw FORUM 453 (1975) arguing that Gertz may signal a revision of the Court's attitude
toward

privacy law.
40. 95 S. Ct. at 1048.
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
43. Thus far, cases which have granted this protection include: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (search and seizure); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (privacy of the home).
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, the tort of invasion of privacy has not been found to be of
federal constitutional dimensions any more than murder and robbery have been."5 On the other hand, as Justice Stewart had pointed
out, a federal constitutional basis for protecting privacy and reputational interests does exist by virtue of the ninth amendment, which
reserves unenumerated rights to the states' protection.
The protection of private personality . . .is left primarily to the
individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this
does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this
Court as a basis for our constitutional system."
Whenever two potentially inconsistent values collide, a balanced assessment of each is required before a choice or compromise
can be made between the two. In the case of press-privacy conflicts,
where both constitutional and tort principles come into play, careful
consideration must be given to the underlying justifications for each
interest and to the extent to which each would be hindered or promoted by adoption of the rules urged by the parties. Although the
late Justice Black and Justice Douglas repeatedly criticized any
balancing or accommodation of first amendment freedoms not explicitly imposed by the framers themselves," a majority of the Court
has consistently rejected this absolutist approach and has engaged
in the weighing of first amendment guarantees against other legitimate interests. The Court used the "weighing and balancing" approach in New York Times and its progeny48 as well as in the pressprivacy cases from Hill to Cox.
As the majority opinion in Cox recognizes, "In this sphere of
collision between claims of privacy and those of the free press, the
interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the tradition and significant concerns of our society." 4 The Court concedes that "powerful
arguments"50 can be made for appellant's proposition that "there is
a zone of privacy surrounding every individual . . .within which
the State may protect him from intrusion by the press."'" However,
45. At least one commentator has argued that perhaps the right of privacy should be
accorded constitutional status. Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 Yale L.J. 1462
(1973).
46. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 223, 355-57 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-401 (1967) (Black, J., concurring), at 401-02 (Douglas,
J., concurring); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
48. See, e.g., note 33 supra.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 1044.
50. Id. at 1042.
51. Id.
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it is in the public disclosure privacy tort "that claims of privacy
most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press
*"52 Justice White then goes on to discuss the vital
role
of the press in informing the citizenry about government and judicial proceedings, thereby enabling the citizenry "to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government
... ,, In so doing, the press also guarantees fair trials and focuses
"public scrutiny upon the administration of justice."54 Having evaluated the respective interests at stake, the Court concludes that
"the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than
that the States may not impose sanctions for the publication of
truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.""5
While, as Justice White aptly points out, a rule which would
make public records available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the reasonable person would have a "chilling
effect" on the press and invite self-censorship, that would not be the
result of the holding urged by the appellee. "One steers clear of a
barbed wire fence, but he stays even farther away if he is not sure
exactly where the fence is, "" but here there is no uncertainty which
need prompt such caution. The publisher has been put on notice by
the state legislature, prior to publication, that the disclosure of
identity will be regarded as offensive. Thus, the press would not, as
Justice White maintains, find it difficult to inform its readers about
public matters, nor would it lead to the suppression of news items
which would otherwise be printed. A vigorous press requires clear
standards of liability and a broad scope of protection. Predictability
is required so that the press can fully exercise its right and duty to
inform. None of these objectives would be compromised by allowing
a state to proscribe the media publication of a rape victim's name.
It strains credulity to suggest that publication of a rape victim's
name in any way provides the public with information it needs to
make self-governing choices. It may pander to public curiosity, but
it cannot be said that society's interest is served by identification
of the victim. There is no question that the public has a legitimate
need and right to be informed of criminal acts and of the subsequent
prosecution of apprehended criminals; however, in a case such as
*

52. Id. at 1043.
53. Id. at 1044.
54. Id. at 1045.
55. Id. at 1046.
56. Wright, Dafamation, Privacy, and the Public'sRight to Know: A NationalProblem
and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 634 (1968).
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this the press does not abrogate its responsibility to inform if it
merely recounts the event without identifying the innocent victim.
Every disclosure case can be broken down into two components: the
identity of the person involved and the remaining relevant facts.
Constitutional guarantees can be met without giving the press license to disclose identities when the facts alone would suffice. Information on public record, protected by the "fair comment" privilege
at common law57 raises problems which should be dealt with selectively and not in a doctrinaire manner.
In Hill, the majority acknowledged that damages for invasion
of privacy might be justified where" 'revelations may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency.' "" This is clearly applicable to
identification of a rape victim where the legislature, speaking for the
electorate it represents, has unambiguously articulated "the community's notions of decency." The objective of such legislation is to
save the rape victim from intense embarrassment and offensive
publicity and to aid law enforcement by encouraging reports and
prosecutions of rapes. It is well-known that many rapes go unpunished because the victim fears the glare of publicity which would
accompany prosecution. 9 Enforcement of the right of privacy in this
carefully circumscribed context accomplishes the dual purpose of
shielding the victim and facilitating enforcement of justice.
The court's all-or-nothing approach to privacy, namely, that
once information is placed in public records all rights to control the
extent of publication cease, fails to distinguish between the degrees
of publicity and amount of damage which results depending on the
method of disclosure. Although a rape victim's name may be on an
indictment and the trial open to anyone who may wish to attend,
the exposure gained from this alone would be miniscule compared
to that resulting from a televised news broadcast aimed at the entire
community. Recognizing this distinction, Professor Franklin has
noted that:
It is fiction to say that a newspaper drawing on public records is only
making accessible what was constructively known by all before ....
57.

For a discussion of the "fair comment" privilege at common law, see PROSSER, supra
LAW OF TORTS, § 5.24-28 (1956); Note, Fair

note 17, at 819-23; 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE
Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1949).

58. 385 U.S. 374, 383, n. 7 (1967) quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806,
809 (2d Cir. 1940); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 15 (1940).
59. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 153, 33 N.W.2d 305, 312, Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1201
(1948) holding that a statute prohibiting identification of a rape victim was not an unconstitutional restraint on the press.
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The nature of the individual item and its intrinsic importance, rather
than its classification as a public record, should perhaps be controlling.60

Dean Prosser also sounded a cautionary note regarding the significance attached to public records:
[T]he existence of a public record is a factor of a good deal of importance, which will normally prevent the matter from being private, but
. . . under some special circumstances it is not necessarily
conclusive.6 ' (Emphasis supplied)

The Court suggests that a state policy which denies the public
and press access to certain kinds of official records and judicial
proceedings (such as juvenile court hearings, divorce proceedings,
and grand jury testimony) is not constitutionally invalid, but "[i]f
there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings,
the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information." 2 Here, the Court
seems to be offering states a constitutionally acceptable way of
protecting such privacy interests, that is, by restricting access to the
pertinent documents. Apparently, this could be done without impairing the constitutionally granted right to a public trial in criminal cases. But if, as the Court suggests, states can constitutionally
restrict the right of general access to documents relating to certain
judicial proceedings, and in so doing notify the press that it prints
such information at the risk of civil or criminal liability, why then
can a state not simply make an unequivocal declaration of its policy
that certain information will be kept private by enacting legislation
prohibiting its publication? In either case the press is left with the
required "breathing space" and the effect on news dissemination
should be the same. In fact, more information about criminal occurrences and judicial proceedings would reach the public if only a
single item of information, the rape victim's name, were denied
media publicity than if, as the Court suggests, public documentation were avoided altogether.
Admittedly, Cohn's case was a weak one. First, his interest was
apparently only a relational one, since it was not his name, but his
60. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on
Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 120-21 (1963).
61. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 396 (1960). In his discussion of Cox, Professor Beytagh expressed concern " . . . about the almost casual manner in which the Court
accepted the 'public records' exception to privacy protection and gave it constitutional status
....
"See Beytagh, supra note 39, at 487.
62. 95 S. Ct. at 1047.
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daughter's, which was reported in the newscast. This has been a
traditional ground for denial of relief.13 Second, his daughter had
died. The general rule is that a decedent's survivors have no legally
protected interest in the privacy of the dead person, no matter how
close the relationship was. In effect, Cohn was claiming that the
invasion of his daughter's privacy, who was already deceased when
the alleged invasion occurred, constituted an invasion of his own
privacy as well-not a very convincing contention by any standard.
Third, although the issue of damages did not go to trial, it would
be difficult to imagine what they might have been. Perhaps the
Court was influenced by these factors and was understandably reluctant to expand the constitutional scope of privacy law on the
basis of such unconvincing facts.
It could be argued that Cox is limited to its facts, and that the
result would not necessarily be so harsh if a privacy action were
brought by a rape victim who could demonstrate that she had sustained real, verifiable injuries. It is easily imaginable that a woman
who was the victim of a particularly sensationalized rape would
suffer tangible harm as a result of widespread publicity. If there
were falsehoods in the news accounts, she might well be able to
prevail in a defamation action. As a private individual, the Gertz
standard would apply and she would be able to recover actual damages so long as she proved that the media were at least negligent in
ascertaining the truth. However, if the reports were accurate to the
letter, a narrow reading of Cox would bar all recovery, even though
her injury might be as great. In a case such as this the resultant
harm would not be produced by the accuracy or falsity of the information, but by disclosure of her identity. Accordingly, it seems
anomalous to base recovery on proof of falsity, when privacy is
invaded just as substantially by true as by false statements.
It is probably easier to concede that such a plaintiff should be
granted relief than it is to formulate a workable test on which her
recovery should be based. Where constitutional guarantees are at
stake, it is not advisable to proceed in an ad hoc fashion. A narrow
rule could be that whenever a state has unequivocally articulated
its policy that certain information not be publicized and a compelling state interest in the restriction can be shown, tort liability may
be imposed for its violation. This would save the Georgia statute but
leave rape victims in states which do not have such a law without a
remedy. A broader rule could be predicated on unwarranted identi63. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 814-15; for a collection of cases, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
873 (1968).
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fication of a participant in a newsworthy event. Thus, the newsworthiness of the event would be judged separately from that of the
person involved. Liability could be keyed to the relevance of the
disclosure to the report of the event so that identification of an
individual when not within the sphere of legitimate public interest
could be the basis of an invasion of privacy suit. Since this rule
would be more likely to infringe on first amendment freedoms than
the narrower one, the New York Times standard of "actual malice"
could be retained as the fault standard. The existence of a public
record would be, as Prosser suggested, 4 a significant, but not a
decisive factor.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Cox, the Supreme Court pits the individual's right to privacy
against the public's right to know and decides that the latter interest must prevail. However, as has been stressed in this Comment,
there is compelling societal interest in preserving individual privacy, for privacy "embodies values which are essential to a free
society."' 5 A government which purports to cherish individual rights
can not afford to disregard the individual's right to privacy. It must
recognize that the right to privacy is more than a "sociological notion" 6 or the "residual" left after other interests have been served.6 7
It is, like the explicitly guaranteed freedoms of speech and press, a
touchstone of democracy. What is at stake is not the individual's
right to privacy versus society's right to be informed. Society and
the individual have a stake in the preservation of both rights, and
where, as in Cox, the scales tip in favor of individual privacy, that
interest should be protected.
Dalma C. Grandjean
64.
65.
66.
67.

See note 61 supra.
Storey, Infringement of Privacy and its Remedies, 47 AUSTL. L.J. 498, 508 (1973).
Davis, What Do We Mean By 'Right to Privacy'? 4 S.D.L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
Kalven, supra note 29, at 327.
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